Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts

Wednesday, 9 August 2017

Who’s helping the Taliban?

The Taliban are fanatic Sunnis and one wouldn't expect Shia Iran to help them. There are reports that Iran is actually doing just that, but that's Breitbart news, which is not very credible.

 

What is credible is this CNN report that Russia is helping the Taliban, its erstwhile enemy!!


Tuesday, 9 April 2013

Book Review: Growing Up Bin Laden by Jean Sasson, Najwa Bin Laden and Omar Bin Laden



Osama Bin Laden, the world’s most wanted man, was killed on 2 May 2011. Even after his execution, bin Laden remains an enigma. Why did the privileged child of a wealthy Saudi family give up a life of comfort and turn jihadi? What motivated bin Laden to resort to terrorism when no one else in his family adopted such violent tactics? Why is it that none of bin Laden’s children, especially his sons, have become terrorists? In order to find answers to these questions, I got hold of an account by one of Bin Laden’s sons and his first wife, which was published in 2009, two years before he was killed.

Najwa Bin Laden, a Syrian lady, was Osama Bin Laden’s first cousin and first wife. Omar Bin Laden was Nawja’s fourth son.
Jean Sasson is an American writer who has spent a big part of her life in the middle-east and has penned a number of books set in the middle-east.

Bin Laden’s father Mohammed Awad bin Laden was a Yemeni immigrant who rose to become one of the wealthiest men in Saudi Arabia. Osama’s mother divorced his father when Osama was very young and remarried his father’s employee Mohammad al Attas. Osama was brought up by his step father al Attas and rarely saw his father Mohammed bin Laden. Osama grew up to be a good boy, pious and obedient. A stickler for rules, Osama slowly became a fanatic Muslim, imposing his feudal and medieval values on his submissive wives and children. He forbade them modern comforts and expected them to live rough. To toughen up his family, he made them trek in the desert and sleep in the open. He made sure that he always had four wives, his women being little more than vehicles for reproduction, expecting all his children to become soldiers of Islam.

When Osama got into trouble with the Saudi government, he fled to Sudan, taking his family with him. When he had to leave Sudan, he went to Afghanistan, living in the caves of Tora Bora as a guest of the Taliban, his family with him. Bin Laden was a weirdo and it’s a surprise that his son Omar turned out to be so peace-loving and “normal”. Please read this fascinating book to find out more about bin Laden’s personal life.



Sunday, 17 February 2013

Book Review: Damn Few – Making The Modern Seal Warrior, by Rorke Denver



Ever since three US Navy SEALs lying on the fantail of USS Bainbridge downed three pirates holding a hostage inside a cabin in the MV Maersk Alabama, SEALs have become a household name in the world of counter-terrorism. The assault on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad only cemented that reputation. In case you’ve wondered what it takes to be a US Navy SEAL and what goes into a making of a SEAL warrior, then Rorke Denver’s book Damn Few is for you. True, there have been a number of books on SEALs before, some of them written by former SEALs. Some months ago, I had reviewed former navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette’s book “No Easy Day” which detailed the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad by SEAL Team Six, of which Bissonnette was a part. No Easy Day expends a lot of energy discussing Navy SEAL tactics and the workings of the mind of a SEAL. Similarly “Seal Target Geronimo”, Chuck Pfarrer’s narrative about the bin Laden raid, though burdened with a number of made-up add-ons, describes SEAL training in good detail. However, Denver’s Damn Few is almost entirely about the making of a SEAL and cuts to the chase right from first page. Also, Denver has been involved in training SEALs and one hears from the horse’s mouth how some men make the cut and some don’t. There are a few snippets of action from Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are just that – snippets – more to illustrate how SEAL training helped them than anything else.

Damn Few is not an impersonal description of SEAL selection process and the training imparted to SEALs. Rather, it is Denver’s very personal story of how a sports crazy boy, not particularly good with Math, brought up by a strong-willed, single mother, motivated by Winston Churchill's writings, ended up as a SEAL. In addition to SEAL training, there are touching tales of Denver growing up with his younger brother, with whom he is very close, bits of family history and how Denver met his wife Tracy.

Like his predecessor Bissonnette, Denver steers clears of politics. This is a soldier’s narrative and it’s written in black and white. They are good guys and there are bad guys and no prizes for guessing who the good guys are. If you are looking for a discussion on American politics or on the decision to invade Iraq or Afghanistan, you will be disappointed. Denver is a soldier who obviously believes in obeying orders – his not to question why.

Denver’s narrative, assisted no doubt by co-author Ellis Henican, a columnist at Newsday, reads very well. The language is simple with an occasional flourish. However, what makes Damn Few stand out from other books about SEALs is that Denver not only trained to be a SEAL, but has been involved in training others and devising training plans. In fact, Denver’s involvement in SEAL training is so total that he allows his readers to be privy to crucial questions such as whether quality will be compromised if the number of SEALs is drastically increased.

In all, Damn Few is an excellent book for any SEAL fan.




Sunday, 23 September 2012

Book Review: No Easy Day by Mark Owen




Former navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette was part of the SEAL Team Six which raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad and executed him. A little over a year after that daring raid into the heart of the Pakistani establishment, Bissonnette has come out with a first person narrative, co-authored with journalist Kevin Maurer, about the events which led to the death of Bin Laden. Bissonnette’s No Easy Day has been published under the pseudonym Mark Owen, but his identity was revealed by Fox News shortly after the first news release of this book came out. Bissonnette is now all over television and YouTube.


The Author’s Note to No Easy Day tells us that Bissonnette has ‘taken great pains to protect the tactics, techniques and procedures used by the teams as they wage a daily battle against terrorists and insurgents around the world. If you are looking for secrets, this is not your book,’ we are told. I am not sure if the Author’s Note was written after the book was written, as an afterthought, but No Easy Day does divulge a lot about Navy SEAL tactics and the workings of the mind of a SEAL. For this 300-odd page book is not just about the Abbottabad raid. It is also the story of what motivated Bissonnette to become a SEAL, the training he underwent before he became one and describes a few operations that preceded the Abbottabad raid, such as the one in which SEALs killed three Somali pirates who had hijacked the Maersk Alabama and held the captain of the ship, Richard Phillips, hostage

The SEALs refer to Osama Bin Laden as Usama Bin Laden. UBL was code-named 'Geronimo' and the operation was called 'Neptune Spear'. It may be remembered that after howls of protests, it was ‘clarified’ by the US Government that 'Jackpot' was the code name for Bin Laden as an individual and 'Geronimo' was the code word for Bin Laden's capture or death. No, Bissonnette doesn’t give any such clarification. I guess the USA is no better than India which insensitively used the phrase the Smiling Buddha for its first nuclear device.

Why did Bissonnette come out with this book? Bissonnette says that he proposes to donate most of the proceeds from book sales to veterans’ charities. One of the reasons for keeping the identities of the SEALs involved in the raid secret is to protect them from revenge attacks. Bissonnette is a brave man and doesn’t seem to care about any possible threat to his life. However, such bravery alone cannot explain why Bissonnette broke his service rules to write this book.

From the manner Bissionette profiles his childhood in Alaska, how he was allowed to use a gun very early in his life, taking responsibility for his firearm, to the statement by one of Bissionette’s comrades just before the raid that if they pull it off, Obama will get re-elected, to the various wise-cracks about Obama, it is clear that Bissionette is Republican or at least, he is anti-Obama. If one goes by Bissionette’s narrative, most SEALs are cut from the same cloth. As Bissionette ends his book, he tells us how when the entire team met with Obama and Biden in Kentucky, Obama invited them all to his residence for a beer, a promise which wasn’t kept. In the closing lines of No Easy Day, Bissionette asks Walt, his friend and fellow SEAL, “Hey, did you ever hear anything about that beer?” Walt’s smirk is back, Bissionette tells us. “You believed that shit,” Walt said. “I bet you voted for change too, sucker.

Mind you, I don’t claim to be an Obama fan. I’ve written a number of not-so-flattering things about Obama in the past. See here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here for my posts on Obama. I’d also predicted (before foot-in-the-mouth-Romney put in an appearance) that Obama won’t win a second term. When I examine Bissonnette's feelings towards Obama, my only interest is to understand what might have motivated Bissonnette to write this account. I’d say it’s highly likely that Bissonnette wanted to convey to his fellow American voters that though Obama was in charge at the time of Operation Neptune Spear and though he gave the green light for the operation to go ahead, the SEALs who really did the job don’t think much of Obama. The fact that the US elections are just around the corner must have played no small part in Bissonnette’s decision to bring out this book at this time.

Bissonnette makes an effort to justify his decision to write this account. In his Epilogue, Bissonnette says that after the raid, so many incorrect account of the attack came out. ‘Even reports claiming to have the inside story have been incorrect. To me, the story is bigger than the raid itself and much more about the men at the command who willingly go into harm’s way, sacrificing all they have to do the job. Theirs is a story that deserves to be told, and told as accurately as possible.’ Further, Bissonnette says that ‘since May 1, 2011, everyone from President Obama to Admiral McRaven has given interviews about the operation. If my commander in chief is willing to talk, then I feel comfortable doing the same.

According to maps given in the book, the SEAL teams flew from Jalalabad to Abbottabad via Indian territory, though on their way back, they took the direct route. Bissonnette does not explain if the Americans evaded Indian radar or if they had permission from India to fly over Indian territory. I feel that they latter is much more likely. India most probably has a system in place for allowing American craft to fly over Indian airspace close to the Pakistani border without the need for elaborate explanations.

Did Bissonnette and his colleagues kill Bin Laden in cold blood? According to No Easy Day, the answer is in the affirmative. Bissonnette tells us that Bin Laden was shot by a SEAL as he peeped out of his room. When Bissonnette entered the room with another SEAL, Bin Laden was on the floor, at the foot of his bed, wearing a white sleeveless T-Shirt, loose tan pants and a tan tunic. ‘The point man’s shots had entered the right side of his head. Blood and brains spilled out of the side of his skull. In his death throes, he was still twitching and convulsing.’ Though Bin Laden was dying, Bissonnette and another SEAL trained their lasers on Bin Laden’s chest and fired several rounds. ‘The bullets tore into him, slamming his body into the floor until he was motionless.

Bissonette and other SEALs who frequently pop sleeping pills to get a good night’s sleep never voice the slightest hesitation about their mission, never question for a second the morality of their action. Immediately after entering the three-storied house, the SEALs killed al-Qaeda operative Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Later they killed Ahmed al-Kuwaiti’s brother Abrar al-Kuwaiti along with his wife Bushra as she tried to shield him. Just before Bin Laden was killed, the SEALs had despatched Bin Laden’s son Khalid. Bissonnette’s descriptions make it clear that the SEALs were not making any serious effort to take Bin Laden or any of the other men alive, though they had been instructed by a lawyer from either the Department of Defence or the White House that ‘if he is naked with his hands up, you are not going to engage him. If he does not pose a threat, you will detain him.' Mind you, I doubt if anyone else in the SEALs' place would have acted any differently, considering they were in hostile Pakistani territory.

Written in simple, functional prose, No Easy Day is a compelling read. It will be interesting to see if the US government takes Bissonnette to task for writing it.

Saturday, 16 June 2012

Book Review: “Pakistan on the Brink – The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West” by Ahmed Rashid



Ahmed Rashid, the author of critically acclaimed books such as Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia and Descent into Chaos, has come up with yet another book on the various dilemmas facing AfPak. Pakistan on the Brink – The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West is not really a book. Rather, it is a collection of essays on the present state of Pakistan and Afghanistan with a few predictions on what the future foretells. To quote the author from the preface, ‘it resembles a book of essays, each dealing with a different aspect of the same problem, discussing the processes that have led to the present impasse. As such, it can be opened anywhere, and any chapter can be read separately from the rest.’ What Rashid doesn’t say is that Pakistan On The Brink is a rambling narrative from an author who has a good insight and sensible views, but doesn’t say a lot that is unknown to one who has followed AfPak, Taliban and the Al Qaeda for the last ten years.

In Descent into Chaos, Rashid had confessed that Hamid Karzai is a good friend and there was little criticism of Karzai. As if to make up for that shortcoming, Pakistan On The Brink ruthlessly takes Karzai to task and almost puts him to the sword. Rashid tells us that in January 2008, he had advised Karzai to not to take part in the next elections and to step down and handover power to someone else. Karzai did not heed Rashid’s advice and in that he was supported by the Americans for whom ‘elections had become a litmus test determining everything else. A U.S. intervention in any third-world country now consisted of holding an early election so that the country could be dubbed a democracy, and then the United States could head for the exit. By contrast, the European philosophy, favoured by the UN, was to first build governance and an economic infrastructure – nation building – so that elections could be both meaningful and sustainable.

Despite its rambling nature, Pakistan On The Brink provides an excellent insight into how the US-Pakistani relationship broke down. Rashid places a fair amount of the blame on Obama for America’s inability to connect with Afghanistan. According to Rashid, unlike George W. Bush, Obama never connected with any group of Afghans. ‘Michelle Obama travelled the world and promoted her favourite interests involving women and children and health, but sadly none were related to Afghanistan’s women and children and the Afghans noticed that too.’ Obama’s Afghan policy was set by the military and did not involve consultations with the Pakistanis or Afghans. Soon the US and Pakistan were talking past each other.

The Americans did not really believe in talking to the Taliban. Even when they did, they continued killing the Taliban by night, something which did not persuade the Taliban to talk to the U.S. Finally when the Germans got the Americans talking to the Taliban, Pakistan’s ISI, which also did not want the U.S to hold talks with the Taliban, arrested Mullah Baradar, the number two Taliban leader who was responsible for the peace talks.

One of the things I like about Rashid’s writing is that he does not hesitate to voice an opinion on the personal abilities of various movers and shakers. In Descent into Chaos, he had expressed a not so flattering opinion on Nawaz Sharif. In Pakistan On The Brink, Rashid says that in contrast to Musharaff, who for all his faults was decisive, Chief of Staff Kiyani has shown himself to be indecisive and unable to hold anyone to account. ‘When Osama bin Laden was killed and the ISI Chief General Pasha offered his resignation, Kayani refused to accept it. Ultimately nobody was punished for Bin Laden’s six-year long presence in Abbottabad.’ With regard to Asif Zardari and Yousaf Gilani, Rashid says both men are terrified of the Pakistani army and only want to have a long and safe term in office. To do so, they do their best to avoid riling the army.

Rashid says that Pakistan lost its 1965 war with India. I was under the impression that it was a stalemate. Rashid also says that in all probability India is supporting Baluchi insurgents. Rashid is sympathetic towards India’s attempts to gain a foothold in Afghanistan. Since India is the most dominant economy in South Asia, Rashid feels that Afghanistan can only benefit from an association with India. Similarly, Rashid wants Pakistan to come to terms with Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Iran has a long border with Afghanistan and Persian is spoken in a large part of Afghanistan. Given such links, it is only inevitable that Iran would want to play a role.

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has practically broken down and it is now a case of enemies working together because they need each other. Rashid suggests that even the Taliban don’t like the ISI all that much – they resent the fact that Pakistan and the ISI want to keep the Afghan pot boiling rather than bring peace to Afghanistan. As Rashid discusses the current situation in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood threadbare, he poses a few interesting questions. Currently many Pakistani ex-servicemen are employed by various Sheikhdoms and in the past Pakistan has despatched its troops to Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries to protect those in power. How would Iran react if Pakistani troops were to help a gulf emirate crush an Arab spring uprising?

Rashid’s final chapter has more of gloomy forebodings than advice to make things better. The only takeaway I got was that nuclear power Pakistan is a much bigger problem than Afghanistan and has to mend itself. Pakistan’s elites must learn to pay taxes and Pakistan’s ruler must stop distinguishing between good and bad Taliban. When Swat was taken over by the Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistani army was able to defeat the militants and drive them away because it did not seek to distinguish between different categories of militants and there was no hidden agenda of protecting one group, as the Pakistani army is currently doing with the Haqqani faction in North Waziristan.

Pakistan On The Brink is a good read for anyone who hasn’t been following the news from Afghanistan and wants to bring himself upto speed on Afghanistan.

Tuesday, 10 January 2012

Book Review: “Seal Target Geronimo – The Inside Story Of The Mission To Kill Osama Bin Laden” by Chuck Pfarrer



I bought this book with great expectations, hoping to read a blow-by-blow account by Chuck Pfarrer, a former SEAL, of the operation by US Navy SEALS that led to the killing Osama bin Laden. Pfarrer does provide a detailed description of the planning and execution of the raid into Abbottabad. Nevertheless I was disappointed because I am not sure how much of this book is true and can be believed.

That’s right. I am not sure I can believe Pfarrer’s account and here’s why:

In addition to providing a detailed description of Operation Neptune Spear (originally called Operation Geronimo) which led to the death of Osama bin Laden, Pfarrer has provided a lot of background information about the growth Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim/Arab grievances in general and the Afghan insurgency in particular. Pfarrer starts with the creation of Israel and the Israel-Palestinian conflicts, goes on to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the contributions to the cause of the Mujahiddin by Arabs like bin Laden who were influenced by the Palestinian dispute and the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pfarrer’s description of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is remarkably fair. There are as many mentions of terrorist activities by the Irgun as there are of PLO-led terrorism. Pfarrer doesn’t shy away from stating that Israeli soldiers stood by and watched as Phalangist Christian militias carried out the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. Pfarrer actually says that Israeli soldiers fired flares to help the militias carry out their dirty work, but I am not sure if that’s factually true. Pfarrer also says that ‘It is one of the ironies of history that the most emblematic weapon of Islamic terrorism, the truck bomb, was invented not by a Muslim fundamentalist, but by a radical Jew. Menachem Begin, the son of a Russian timber merchant, came to......’ I didn’t know that the truck bomb was emblematic of Islamic terrorism. As far as I know, truck bombs have been used by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh and the IRA. What gives Pfarrer the right to say that truck bombs are emblematic of Islamic terrorism? Statements such as these are only a foretaste of what’s to come.

According to Pfarrer (try not to laugh as you read this), Saddam Hussein did have weapons of mass destruction. After the US and its allies invaded Iraq, large quantities of WMD were handed over by Iraqi forces to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. This may make you wonder why there have been no attacks on coalition troops with chemical weapons. But there have been a number of such attacks, all of which failed due to a combination of the lack of skilled personnel at Al Qaeda Inc, bad luck (Al Qaeda’s) and the courage of US troops. On a number of occasions, Army’s Tech Escort Battalions whose personnel are skilled at handing nuclear and chemical disasters had to be called in to deal with chemical weapons planted by the Al Qaeda in Iraq. And why didn’t any of the newspapers or news channels report all this in detail? Because they had originally claimed that Saddam did not have WMD and hence have a vested interest in maintaining that fiction.

How did the US detect bin Laden’s location? Because bin Laben’s number two, Ayman Zawahiri betrayed bin Laden by using a courier whose cover had been blown to carry messages to bin Laden. According to Pfarrer, Zawahiri had been trying to get Osama bin Laden killed ever since the day they were fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It was Zawahiri who betrayed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was the main brain behind the 9/11 attacks. Why did Zawahiri do so? Because he was jealous of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was sociable and clever and was favoured by bin Laden.

The fictions go on and on and since Pfarrer seems to make up a lot of stuff, I am not sure how much of his detailing of Operation Neptune Spear can be believed.

In addition to the various fictions inserted in this book, there is a fair amount of melodrama. When Pfarrer describes how a predator drone targeted and killed Zarqawi (whose killing had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden’s), he says: ‘Six miles above the date grove, unseen and unheard, a Predator drone, call sign Reaper Three Zero, banked at the edge of the stratosphere. It’s sensors rolled over the city below. Streetlights, car headlights, the lights of houses spread in a rolling blanket, like a mosaic of stars. The lights marked progress and peace, businesses and places where families lived. In the dark places there was poverty, frustration and anger. The dark places were where men like Zarqawi preached hatred and planned murder.’

Sometimes, certain incidents are mentioned twice, which can be irritating. For example, we are told that ‘there was almost always a pinch of Copenhagen snuff tucked into (Red Squadron’s leader) Frank Leslie’s lower lip’ We are told about the Copenhagen snuff in two different places. Ayman Zawahiri’s killing is described twice, once in melodramatic detail and later in a matter-of-fact manner.

Pfarrer does not provide any authority or reference or bibliography for his sources of information.

Pfarrer’s description of how the US Navy trains its SEALs is very good and I assume it is an accurate description, since Pfarrer is an ex-SEAL. Also, I assume that at least some of the details of Operation Neptune Spear must be true, though one turns sceptical when one reads that the US didn’t use its most stealthy stealth helicopter for this operation since it feared it might fall into Pakistani hands.

Oh and by the way, according to Pfarrer, the bomb which killed Zia-ul-Haq was planted by the KGB in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for the Mujahiddin.

Wednesday, 19 October 2011

The Scorpion's Tail by Zahid Hussain – Book Review



Zahid Hussain is a Pakistan based journalist and correspondent who has worked for the Wall Street Journal, The Times of London and Newsweek. His book The Scorpion's Tail was released almost a year ago, but I got around to reading it only now.

Minus its notes and index, The Scorpion's Tail runs to just over 200 pages and is an easy read because a large chunk of it is written in the style of reportage. Hussain traces the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan from the time of its creation when clerics of the Deobandi sect opposed India’s partition because they felt it would weaken Muslim power in the Indian subcontinent. Though Hussain is short on analysis, The Scorpion’s Tail is an excellent description of the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. One gets a ring-side view of events as they unfolded and as Pakistan moved away from democracy towards dictatorship and gave Islamic fundamentalists a greater say in public affairs.

Hussain’s sources are mainly news reports from the BBC, CNN and similar news vendors. He has also relied on his own interviews with various people, such as friends of Benazir Bhutto. Hussain commences his books thus: ‘On a hot August night in the remote town of Makin in Pakistan’s South Waziristan tribal region, a short and stocky bearded man, hooked up to an intravenous drip, lay on a cot on the rooftop of a vast house. A young woman in her late teens massaged his legs. Nearby a predator drone hovered in the clear sky, then zoomed in on the couple………

While describing the attack on the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on 10 October 2009, Hussain tells us that ‘the men in crisp white fatigues riding a white Suzuki van with a military registration plate evoked no suspicion. The guards at the first security checkpoint waved them through………….As the van made its way past the checkpoint, gunmen suddenly jumped out and started firing indiscriminately………the gunmen ran towards the heavy iron gates. Apparently out of nowhere appeared another group of gunmen in uniform, and before the guards could realise what was happening several of them were shot. An intense firefight broke out when the soldiers in the watchtowers began firing on the intruders, killing three of them and injuring another. Gunmen coming up just behind the injured attacker then shot their wounded colleague dead in an attempt to confuse the guards. The trick worked: the guards made no attempt to stop the attackers as they rushed towards…….Brig. Anwar ul-Haq, the director of security, was in a conference in his office in the building when the melee broke out. Interrupting the meeting and rushing into the hallway, he saw a man in military uniform with his back turned to him and called out, “Move away from here.” The man turned around and shot him dead.

How did Hussain know what exactly Brig. Anwar ul-Haq said to the gunman before he was shot dead? Hussain does not reveal his source. No, I am not disputing Hussain’s version since various newsreports, such as this New York Times report, have said something very similar.

While describing the 4 December 2009 terrorist attack on a mosque in Rawalpindi frequented by military officers which killed 36 people, Hussain does not tell us if the mosque was Shia or Sunni. The name Askari suggests Shia, but then I am no expert on these matters.

What I didn’t like about The Scorpion’s Tail is that Hussain avoids expressing his own view even when the circumstances beg him to do so. For example, Hussain tells us that after Benazir Bhutto was killed ‘Zardari produced Benazir’s will which declared that he should lead the party in the event she was killed. Many of her friends and associates believed that the will was fabricated, but given the turmoil in the party due to her death, he faced little opposition in the party ranks.’ A footnote tells us that Hussain bases this report ‘on author interviews with close friends and aides to Benazir Bhutto.’ However, what’s Hussain’s view? Does he feel the will produced by Zardari was fabricated? We never know.

Hussain’s conclusions are very simple. According to Hussain, there is a fundamental flaw in the U.S approach to the war, namely a failure to appreciate that the Taliban are essentially Pashtuns fighting to evict outsiders in their historical homelands, just as they fought the Red Army and other earlier invaders. Hussain feels that this war is unwinnable for the US and feels that a political settlement is the only solution. Hussain makes a few references to India’s attempts to gain a foothold in Afghanistan and hints that Pakistan’s ISI is justified in supporting the Taliban in an effort to counter Indian influence over non-Pashtu ethnic groups in Afghanistan, especially northern Afghanistan. In short (though he doesn’t spell it out), Hussain wants the Pashtu dominated Taliban to be given control over Afghanistan, at least the Pashtu majority areas, and hopes that such a settlement will put an end to the terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

As Aryn Baker, Time's bureau chief for Pakistan and Afghanistan has written in this article, it is clear that the US troops in Afghanistan are fighting a losing battle and it is only a matter of time before they leave Afghanistan. Once they do, the Taliban are bound to defeat the rag-tag Afghan National Army and re-establish the control they had prior to 9/11. A few Tajik and Uzbek warlords may control a few slices of territory in the north. However, will that put an end to fighting in Pakistan? What’s the guarantee that the Pakistani Taliban will not continue the fight in Pakistan for a greater say in government? Wouldn’t the Al Qaeda like the idea of controlling a state which has nuclear weapons? With a safe haven in Afghanistan, wouldn’t Islamic fundamentalists want to continue the good fight which started out as revenge attacks in retaliation for Pakistani support for the US forces and the drone campaign? It is very unlikely that Islamic fundamentalists will manage to take over Pakistan. Most Pakistanis are happy to use the militants to fight in Kashmir and elsewhere, but as explained by Anatol Lieven in his brilliant book Pakistan: A Hard Country, Pakistanis do not want mullahs to rule Pakistan. The Pakistani army carried out a successful campaign against the Taliban in Swat and (to a lesser extent) in South Waziristan. If needed, the Pakistani army has the ability and determination to fight the Taliban if they attempt to takeover Pakistan. However, none of this precludes the Taliban from making a bloody and very expensive (for everybody) attempt to do so.

Thursday, 14 July 2011

“The Most Dangerous Place”, by Imtiaz Gul – Book Review


Veteran Pakistani reporter Imtiaz Gul is also an executive director at the Centre for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad. Gul’s book The Most Dangerous Place was first published by Penguin in early 2010 and as a paperback in 2011. Pakistan and Afghanistan have been in the global limelight for many years, for all the wrong reasons, and any book which focuses on the badlands of Pakistan is likely to become outdated very quickly, since there is so much happening every day in that part of the world. Maybe it is for this reason that The Most Dangerous Place comes with a preface, a preface to the paperback edition and an epilogue, each of which seeks to catch up with new developments and place the book in context.

Gul is a reporter and one of the first things that hits you even before you cross page 30 is that The Most Dangerous Place is almost entirely a compilation of past reports and quotations from various players with Gul almost never taking a stand or expressing an opinion of his own – until he gets to the last chapter, “Who Funds the Militants”. If one ignores the near total absence of the author’s opinions and views, one can get a blow by blow account of how, starting from the period just before the Soviet’s invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan got enmeshed in Jihadi politics, and fighting, which was at times between various Mujahidin factions, and ended up as the most dangerous place on earth.

As if to compensate for the absence of any analyses till then, the last chapter is packed with theories (most of them quotes given by others) and Gul finally expresses an opinion or two. Who funds the militants? Gul examines various possibilities. Are militants funded by the proceeds of cultivating poppy? Is the Frontier Corps also a culprit? Does the timber mafia have a hand in funding the Pakistani Taliban? What role do Islamic charities and the Hawala system play in funding insurgents? Do the Americans fund the Taliban? Gul does not rule out this possibility. Gul quotes Brigadier Mehmood Shah, a former security secretary for FATA who suggests that the Americans might be trying to co-opt some of the militants into their operational strategy and fix Al Qaeda from within. Is it Saudi Arabia? Not the Government of Saudi Arabia, Gul seems to say, though private individuals and parties based in Saudi Arabia could be funding the Pakistani Taliban.

Is there an Indian hand behind the Pakistani Taliban? No, Gul doesn’t rubbish this possibility, though it sounded ridiculous to my ears. Rather, he puts forth a lot of circumstantial evidence to suggest that there could be some truth behind this allegation. For example, after the Kandahar hijacking, an Indian security official is reported to have told Gul – “we will absorb what you have done to us, but can you absorb what we might do to you?” Gul quotes from Baitullah Mehsud’s aides who mention offers of alleged assistance from India. Gul doesn’t straight out say that he believes India is funding the Taliban in Pakistan – that would be too ludicrous. He does however try to build a case for this theory.

Is the ISI in cahoots with the militants in Pakistan? This is one theory which Gul categorically dismisses as silly – even this dismissal is done in a roundabout manner. Do please read this interesting book to know more about these theories and Gul’s views on them.

One of the good things about The Most Dangerous Place is that is has a number of trivia on the Taliban. We hear an explanation given by the Taliban to a potential suicide bomber who wanted to know why the Taliban never attacked Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries which shelter American troops. The answer is that “We receive funds from Arab countries, therefore we cannot carry out any attack there, and if we commit any wrong there, they will stop supply of funds to us. But Jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan is lawful, even the Saudis believe so.

There is a description of how the University of Nebraska, which had an association with Afghanistan ever since 1975, when its Afghan Centre linked up with Kabul University was tasked by the CIA in the early 1980s with producing new textbooks that would help inspire the Afghans to “jihad” against “infidel Soviets.” This message made its way into the pages of primary school textbooks in forms like this alphabet song:

A [is for] Allah. Allah is one
B [is for] Father (baba). Father goes to the mosque
D [is for] Religion (din). Our religion is Islam. The Russians are the enemies of the religion of Islam.
J [is for] Jihad. Jihad is an obligation. My mom went on jihad. My brother gave water to the Mujahidin.
P [is for] Five (panj). Islam has five pillars
V [is for] Nation (vatn). Our nation is Afghanistan. The Mujahidin made our nation famous. Our Muslim people are defeating the communists. The Mujahidin are making the dear country free.
Z [is for] Good news (muzhdih). The Mujahidin missiles rain down like dew on the Russians. My brother gave me the good news that the Russians in our country will taste defeat.

The lessons for older students were more explicit: one fourth-grade mathematics question asks students to use a bullet’s speed and its total distance travelled to calculate the elapsed time before its strikes its Russian target in the forehead.

In 2002, the Afghan Center at the University of Nebraska was approved to begin a fourteen-month, $6.4 million co-operative agreement with USAID, designed to assist in the opening of primary and secondary schools in Afghanistan by printing and distributing textbooks in Dari and Pashtu. An elederly Afghan teacher scribbles in a register, “we are now removing what we inserted into these books twenty years ago.

Some of the best things about this book are its two appendices which has profiles of a number of Pakistani militants and militant organisations. For someone like me who is very much interested in knowing more about Pakistani militants and their groupings, this book serves as a treasure trove of information. A veritable encyclopaedia it is! Also, Gul’s descriptions of events such as the Kaloosha incident where scores of South Waziristan Scouts were killed and details of the fighting that took place in Swat, especially the tactics used by the Pakistani army in recapturing lost terrain and driving out the Taliban, are excellent.

Now that Osama bin Laden has been located and killed, every time I read a book on the Pakistani Taliban that was published prior to his killing, I look for theories on bin Laden’s location or predictions for his capture. Gul tells us that “Bajaur’s proximity to Kunar fuels suspicions that Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri may be hiding in the area.” A few pages later, this theory is mentioned again. In the first paragraph of the original preface, Gul quotes Barack Obama who mentions bin Laden’s name as he elaborated how the Af-Pak border is the most dangerous place on earth. Towards the end of the first chapter, Gul tells us that “back in the 1980s, Osama bin Laden had also found sanctuary on the fringes of Miranshah in North Waziristan, the tribal agency that borders the eastern Afghan province of Khost.’ There are a few references to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mullah Omar as well. In his epilogue, Gul says that “it is unlikely that Pakistan will go after the most wanted leaders of Al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban, such as Mullah Omar or Gulbuddin Hekmetyar.” Right! Pakistan didn’t, but the United States did. In all probability Gul was as surprised as anyone else when bin Laden was located and killed in Abbottabad, not far from the Centre for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad where Gul works.

Monday, 27 June 2011

“Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security”, by Ahmed Rashid – A Few Observations



I recently re-read Ahmed Rashid’s “Descent into Chaos” which was released sometime in the middle of 2008. A masterpiece by an expert who has very peers in his field, Descent into Chaos is relevant and useful for someone who wants to understand the Af-Pak conundrum, even three years after its publication. Rather that write a detailed review of this excellent book which has been reviewed so many times by so many clever writers, I propose to make a few observations:

1. After the caveat that Hamid Karzai is a good friend, Rashid has nothing but praise for Karzai who hasn’t exactly lived up to the expectations created when he took over power. The number of times Rashid criticizes Karzai can be counted on the fingers of one hand. I found the near total absence of criticism of Karzai to be the biggest drawback in this book.

2. Rashid devotes extensive space to explain how the US administration under George Bush flagrantly breached the Geneva Convention as it set up detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and other places and carried out renditions of suspected Islamic fundamentalists. I wonder if Rashid would continue to feel so strongly about the use of torture in light of the fact that information gleaned from suspects through the use of intensive interrogation techniques helped locate Bin Laden. The fact of the matter is that torture does work at times and those who are against the use of torture should be willing to say that States should not resort to torture even if it may work.

3. Rashid describes Nawaz Sharif thus: ‘A businessman from Lahore whose family had prospered enormously under the Zia regime was a dour, unintelligent politician who had been promoted and patronized by the military.’ I find this description very interesting. I’ve never heard anyone else call Sharif unintelligent. Mind you, I have no reason to think Rashid has got it wrong.

4. Rashid has only praise for Benazir Bhutto, even more than he has for Karzai. There is a vague mention of the corruption charges against Bhutto, but Rashid tells us that ‘There is little doubt that Bhutto and Karzai working together would have formed a team committed to combat extremism.

5. Asif Zardari is depicted as a wise man who, unfortunately and for no fault of his own, happens to be corrupt.

I guess when one is Pakistani and is close to most of the big players in that region, one is bound to have a few sacred cows in one’s backpack. I realise that my observations above may give the impression that I did not like ‘Descent into Chaos’. Far from it, I really liked the book and Rashid’s pithy style of writing.

Rashid concludes by saying that (remember this is mid-2008): ‘The American people have elected a new President who is largely committed to change and improving the world we live in. Obama has generated enormous expectations in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In order to live upto those expectations, he has to help deliver a long-lasting peace and stabilization program in the region.

Wednesday, 24 November 2010

The Afghan Campaign by Steven Pressfield - A Book Review


Afghanistan is supposed to be the graveyard of foreign armies and empires. The US and other coalition forces are relearning this lesson now. Soldiers from the British Empire, many of whom were recruited from the subcontinent, learnt this over a century ago. However, Alexander the Great’s invasion of the various kingdoms that comprised modern day Afghanistan was an exception to this rule. Despite enormous losses of men, Alexander managed to subdue Afghanistan after a three-year campaign, after which he moved to India. Steven Pressfield, author of the highly acclaimed Gates of Fire, an account of how 300 Spartans held the Persian army at bay for many days, has written an equally exciting account of Alexander’s Afghan campaign. Mind you, this book came out almost four years ago, though I managed to read it very recently.

Narrated by a lowly soldier, a cavalryman named Matthias, The Afghan Campaign starts with Matthias’s enrolment and his departure for the field of war, Matthias’s father has recently died of Sepsis in Afghanistan,whilst serving Alexander. Two of Matthias’s brothers have been with Alexander for many years. And what’s Matthias’s motive for signing up? Glory and wealth. This seems to be the case with most Macedonians and other Greeks.

One of the most interesting things about this book is the author’s abundant use of modern military terminology. Catapults and bolt throwers are described as ‘artillery’ and ‘missile troops’. Alexander’s army has whole divisions of ‘engineers’, whose jobs range from building bridges to undermining forts. Macedonians are referred to as Macks and military ranks in Alexander’s army vary from sergeant to corporal to captain. In between, Pressfield slips in mentions of phalanxes and Xiphos (sword). More often than not, Matthias and his colleagues carry out ‘cordon operations’, using ‘block and search’ tactics.

Here’s a sample of Pressfieldese:

The column marches in four sections. The vanguard breaks the trail. These are army engineers. Their division leads three thousand camels, laden with timber post and beams, cables, ropes, planking and fittings; they will fabricate bridges to span the torrents and gorges in spate. The van drives sheep and oxen as well, not only to drag timbers for the construction, bit to beat down the trail - and to be slaughtered for meat. To protect the fore elements, the engineers have archers, slingers and javelineers, mercenary cavalry of Lydia, Armenia and Media, with hired Afghans of the west, mountain troops who hate the Panjshiri and our own Mack pioneers. The latter are the miscreants of the army, stripped of the privilege of bearing arms and handed axes and mattocks instead. The poor scuffs are clearing tracks through twenty and thirty foot high drifts. Alexander and the elite units come next, the agema of the Companions, the Royal Guardsman, battalions of Perdiccas’s and Creterus’s crack brigades with Agrianian javelineers, Cretan archers and specialised mountain companies, including combat engineers with stone throwers and bolt-hurlers. These divisions will take the foe in strength, here in the Panjshirif if the tribesmen contest our passage, and on the plains of Bactria beyond, when the King overhauls Bessus’s and Spitamenes’ cavalry. Next the central phalanx brigades, including ours, Hephaestion’s and Ptolemy’s and the non-detached battalions of Perdiccas and Craterus; then the heavy sections; then the light brigades of Erigius, Attlus, Gorgias, Meleager, and Polyperchon, along with mercenary and Iranian cavalry. The baggage, such as there is, comes between them and the rearguard, composed of foreign contingents and native light troops. The total is nearly fifty thousand.

I initially found Pressfield’s use of contemporary terminology disconcerting and even upsetting. I felt cheated. However, by the time I was half way through, I had settled in and stopped differentiating between English, Greek and Afghan words.

The Afghan Campaign has plenty of drama. Matthias practises Greek philoxenia (love for stranger) which easily comes into in conflict with Afghan ‘Nangauli’. Nangauli translates into honour, revenge and hospitality. If a woman is in distress and her male relatives are not in a position to help her, but a stranger does, the woman has brought dishonour to her family and should be killed! Does that make sense to you? It doesn’t to me and I wish I could find out if Pressfield made that one up or if Nangauli was a historical fact. To me, Nangauli appears to be a more extreme version of the Sharia, as practised in certain parts of modern day Afghanistan.

Pressfields’ description of battle scenes are excellent. There’s one where the Afghan warlord Spitamenes is facing Alexander’s troops across a river. Afghan archers are itching for the fight and they think they have the upper hand. Alexander, the master deceiver, has a few trumps up his sleeve and the result is a rout for the Afghans. After a few pages of masterly narration, Matthias the narrator makes an innocuous statement: “The Afghan does not understand modern artillery” (emphasis supplied) Towards the end of the book, there’s a final battle where Alexander’s troops decimate Spitamenes’s army. Those few pages alone make it worthwhile to read the entire book. I won’t spoil the fun, please do read it for yourself.

What was the secret of Alexander’s (relative) success in Afghanistan? There are two secrets. One, Greek soldiers were brutal, as brutal as the Afghans who thought nothing of flaying captives alive or using equally painful methods to torture and execute men. There were wholesale massacres of villages and communities. Opposition was simply not tolerated. Two, at the end of the book, Alexander marries Roxane, daughter of the Warlord Oxyartes who was one of the various chieftains opposing him. Alexander’s marriage earns him a number of friends and pacifies most of Afghanistan. If you think I am being a spoilsport in disclosing the ending, you are wrong. The Afghan Campaign begins with Alexander’s wedding and the rest of the book is a flashback.

Can the US and the rest of NATO take a leaf from Alexander’s book? I doubt it. These days, western solders can’t be ruthless and cruel. However, Obama can and should emulate Alexander and take Mullah Omar’s daughter as his second wife. May be that will pacify Afghanistan and enable the troops to return home.